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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-3636 
 
RHONE-POULENC SURFACTANTS AND 
SPECIALTIES, L.P., GAF CHEMICALS 
CORPORATION, A PARTNER OTHER 
THAN THE TAX MATTERS PARTNER, 
 
       Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 
 
       Appellee 
 
On Appeal From the United States Tax Court 
(Tax Court Docket No. 2125-98) 
(114 T.C. No. 34) 
 
Argued January 19, 2001 
 
Before: ROTH and BARRY, Cir cuit Judges 
SHADUR,1 District Judge  
 
(Opinion filed: May 1, 2001) 
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1. Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Court Judge for the 
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 
  
       William F. Nelson, Esq. (argued) 
       Gerald A. Kafka, Esq. 
       J. Bradford Anwyll, Esq. 
       McKee Nelson Ernst & Young, LLP 
       1919 M Street, N.W., Suite 800 
       Washington, DC 20036 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
       Charles F. Marshall, Esq. (argued) 
       Paula M. Junghans, Esq. 
       Richard Farber, Esq. 
       Tax Division 
       Department of Justice 
       P.O. Box 502 
       Washington, DC 20044 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SHADUR, District Judge: 
 
Taxpayer GAF Chemicals Corporation ("GAF "), a 
subsidiary of GAF Corporation and a purported partner in 
the putative partnership Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants and 
Specialties, L.P. ("Rhone-Poulenc"),filed a petition for 
readjustment of partnership items in the United States Tax 
Court under 26 U.S.C. S6226(b).2 GAF filed its petition in 
response to a notice of final partnership administrative 
adjustment ("FPAA") issued by the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") to Rhone-Poulenc 
pursuant to Section 6223(a)--an FPAA that tr eated a 
transfer of assets from GAF to Rhone-Poulenc as a taxable 
sale rather than as a nontaxable contribution in exchange 
for an interest in the partnership. 
 
This appeal stems from the Tax Court's denial of GAF 's 
motion for summary judgment on the ground that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. All further citations to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
("Code") will simply take the form "Section--," omitting the prefatory "26 
U.S.C." 
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Commissioner's assessment is time-barred. Although that 
order was not final, the Tax Court certified it for 
interlocutory appeal under Section 7482(a)(2)(A), and this 
Court granted GAF 's petition for permission to appeal. 
 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, wefind that 
GAF 's petition for permission to appeal was improvidently 
granted. Upon our further consideration of the issues 
presented for decision, we hold that Tax Court rulings on 
certain unresolved issues that Court has r eserved for the 
future constitute a precondition to the ripeness of the 
issues certified by that Court, so that we have essentially 
been presented with a request for an advisory opinion 
forbidden by Article III of the Constitution. 
 
Background 
 
In 1990 GAF and Alkaril Chemicals, Inc. ("Alkaril"), 
another subsidiary of GAF Corporation, transferr ed certain 
business assets to Rhone-Poulenc. About September 17, 
1991 Rhone-Poulenc filed a federal partnership information 
return that characterized GAF 's transfer to it as a 
contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for 
an interest in the partnership. Almost simultaneously (the 
record-indicated date is September 16, 1991) GAF 
Corporation filed a consolidated corporate federal income 
tax return for itself and all of its affiliated subsidiary 
corporations (including GAF). 
 
On September 12, 1997 the Commissioner issued Rhone- 
Poulenc an FPAA notice that treated the transfer as a 
taxable sale rather than as an exchange for a partnership 
interest entitled to non-recognition tr eatment under Section 
721(a). It followed from the FPAA's tr eatment of the transfer 
as a taxable sale that GAF Corporation's consolidated 
return had understated its gross income by 25%. In 
response to the FPAA, GAF filed a petition in the Tax Court 
for a readjustment of partnership items. 
 
GAF brought that petition pursuant to the unified 
partnership audit and litigation procedur es of the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"). As 
Boyd v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 365, 368-69 (1993) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted) explains: 
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       The TEFRA partnership provisions were enacted in 
       1982 in response to the mushrooming administrative 
       problems experienced by the Internal Revenue Service 
       in auditing returns of partnerships, particularly tax 
       shelter partnerships with numerous partners. Under 
       these procedures, the tax treatment of partnership 
       items is determined at the partnership level in a 
       unified partnership proceeding rather than in separate 
       proceedings for each partner. As we stated in an earlier 
       case interpreting the TEFRA partnership pr ovisions: 
 
       By enacting the partnership audit and litigation 
       procedures, Congress provided a method for 
       uniformly adjusting items of partnership income, 
       loss, deduction, or credit that affect each partner. 
       Congress decided that no longer would a partner's 
       tax liability be determined uniquely but the tax 
       treatment of any partnership item would be 
       determined at the partnership level. 
 
Although it is the tax matters partner that most often files 
a petition for readjustment under TEFRA, if it does not do 
so within 90 days any notice partner may file a petition 
within 60 days thereafter (Section 6226(b)(1)). 
 
Before the Tax Court the Commissioner ar gued on 
several alternative grounds that the transfer did not qualify 
for non-recognition treatment: 
 
        1. There was no partnership. 
 
        2. If instead there were a partnership, the transfer 
       was not to it but to a related party. 
 
        3. If there were indeed a partnership and the transfer 
       were in fact made to it, the transfer was not in 
       exchange for an interest in the partnership but was 
       rather a sale to the partnership. 
 
In those terms GAF would have had to sur mount all three 
hurdles to prevail. 
 
On September 9, 1998 GAF moved for summary 
judgment on the separate ground that the assessment is 
time-barred. Its motion asserted: 
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        1. Section 6501(a)'s general limitations period is 
       inapplicable to partnership items because Section 
       6629(a) sets forth a separate and exclusive thr ee-year 
       statute of limitations on assessments attributable to 
       partnership items. Because more than thr ee years had 
       elapsed since GAF Corporation had filed its 
       consolidated return, the assessment was untimely. 
 
        2. Even if Section 6501(a) were held to pr ovide the 
       applicable limitations period, the issuance of the FPAA 
       did not suspend the running of that period, and it too 
       has expired. Again that would render the assessment 
       untimely. 
 
        3. Section 6501(e), which provides a six-year statute 
       of limitations where items in excess of 25% of a 
       taxpayer's gross income are omitted fr om the face of a 
       return, is inapplicable because the items at issue were 
       disclosed on the consolidated return. 
 
In response the Commissioner urged that the general 
limitation on assessments set out in Section 6501(a) 
governs all taxes assessed under the Code. As for Section 
6229(a), the Commissioner contended that it does not 
provide a separate limitations period for partnership items 
but rather describes an "add on" period that in some 
circumstances extends the period prescribed by Section 
6501. As the Commissioner would have it, the nor mal 
three-year period set forth in Section 6501(a) had been 
extended to six years under Section 6501(e) because, 
contrary to GAF 's assertion, the disputed income was not 
disclosed on the return. And the Commissioner further 
argued that under Section 6229(d) the issuance of the 
FPAA had suspended the limitations period pr escribed in 
Section 6501--in this case the six-year period in Section 
6501(e) to which Section 6501(a) points. 
 
In a sharply divided opinion, a majority of the judges on 
the Tax Court (sitting en banc) found the Commissioner's 
reading of the Code provisions mor e persuasive and denied 
GAF 's motion for summary judgment. In particular , the 
majority concluded that the limitations period set forth in 
Section 6501(a) applies to partnership items. As for the 
Section 6229(a) reference to a thr ee-year period, the Court 
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read that provision as setting a minimum limitations period 
that "may expire before or after the section 6501 maximum 
period." 
 
Next the Tax Court addressed GAF 's ar gument that even 
if the six-year limitation specified in Section 6501(e) 
applied, that period had expired as well. In that respect 
GAF argued that by its terms Section 6229(d) suspends 
only the running of the three year period in Section 
6229(a), not the limitations period contained in Section 
6501(a). On that premise, even if the T ax Court were to find 
that Section 6501(a) dictated the application of the six-year 
limitations period in Section 6501(e), that six-year period 
had already expired about September 15, 1997 (six years 
after the date GAF Corporation had filed its r eturn). 
 
Again agreeing with the Commissioner's dif ferent reading 
of the Code, the Tax Court determined that Section 6229(d) 
does suspend the running of the limitations period 
prescribed by Section 6501 once an FPAA is issued. If 
Section 6501(e) were applicable, then, that would render 
timely the Commissioner's issuance of the FP AA within six 
years of the date of the partnership retur n. 
 
With the Tax Court having made those determinations, 
the only issue remaining for decision ther e was whether 
Section 6501(e) in fact applies to this case. In that regard 
the Tax Court found genuine issues of fact as to whether or 
not the return had adequately disclosed the existence of the 
omitted income, precluding summary judgment. 
 
On September 20, 2000 the Tax Court granted GAF 's 
Motion for Certification of Question for Interlocutory Appeal 
pursuant to Section 7482(a). As stated earlier , a panel of 
this Court granted GAF 's petition for per mission to appeal 
on October 12. 
 
Standing 
 
Before we turn directly to the substantive discussion that 
controls the disposition of this appeal, we must travel a 
byway that might have diverted us from r eaching that 
substantive issue. That potential diversion stems fr om a 
post-appeal development that has raised a possible issue of 
standing on the part of the taxpayer. 
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By letter dated January 11, 2001 counsel for GAF 
informed us that G-I Holdings, Inc., the successor to GAF 
Corporation through internal merger , has filed a voluntary 
petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New 
Jersey seeking relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. That led to the filing of two motions befor e oral 
argument. 
 
First both sides asked that the case be taken of f of the 
Court's calendar because under 11 U.S.C. S362 
("Bankruptcy S362") G-I Holding's filing had assertedly 
operated to stay this appeal. Then the parties thought 
better of that somewhat Pavlovian (and entir ely erroneous) 
notion: the Commissioner's later-filed Motion To Dismiss 
GAF Chemicals Corp. as a Party and GAF 's Opposition to 
that motion (as to which more below) reversed course on 
that issue. 
 
We determined before oral ar gument that Bankruptcy 
S362 does not in fact stay the appeal, for that provision 
stays only actions or proceedings "against the debtor" 
(emphasis added). Here the proceeding before the Tax Court 
was brought by the debtor (or, more accurately, by its 
corporate predecessor). As is true of all other types of 
litigation brought by debtors that are under the protection 
of the bankruptcy courts (see most recently Aiello v. 
Providan Fin. Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 101533, at *2 
(7th Cir. Feb. 6), citing other cases, including our own 
Maritime Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F .2d 1194, 
1204-05 (3d Cir. 1991), two of the thr ee cases that have 
addressed the same question in the context of appeals by 
a debtor from Tax Court proceedings initiated by that 
debtor (Roberts v. Comm'r, 175 F.3d 889, 893-96 (11th Cir. 
1999) and Freeman v. Comm'r, 799 F .2d 1091 (5th Cir. 
1986)(per curiam)) have held that Bankruptcy S362 does 
not stay such appeals; contra, Delpit v. Comm'r , 18 F.3d 
768, 771-73 (9th Cir. 1994). We like the Eleventh Circuit 
find the Ninth Circuit's position to be unpersuasive and out 
of sync with this Circuit's general jurisprudence addressing 
Bankruptcy S362, and we too adopt the no-stay view. 
 
With that threshold issue out of the way, the 
Commissioner then also moved to dismiss GAF as a party 
to the proceedings and to dismiss the appeal unless 
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another party with standing to litigate the same issue were 
to intervene within a reasonable time. Under Section 
6226(d)(1)(A) a partner is no longer treated as a party to a 
TEFRA proceeding when its partnership items ar e converted 
to non-partnership items by reason of certain events 
described in Section 6231 (see Section 6231(c)(2) and 
6231(c)(1)(E)). On that score Treas. Reg. S301.6231(c)-7T 
(found in 26 C.F.R.) provides that the effective and efficient 
enforcement of the tax laws requir es that when a partner is 
named as a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, its 
partnership items must be treated as non-partnership 
items (see Computer Programs Lambda, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 89 
T.C. 198, 203 (1987), upholding and applying that 
regulation). 
 
Accordingly the Commissioner's motion ur ged that even if 
it were ultimately to be determined that the transfer of 
assets had been in exchange for a partnership inter est, 
GAF 's partnership items were converted to non-partnership 
items for tax purposes when G-I Holdings filed its 
bankruptcy petition. That being so, the Commissioner's 
position was that GAF no longer has an inter est in the 
outcome and can no longer be a party to the action under 
Section 6226(d)(1)(A). 
 
But GAF has responded in part that in any event ACI, 
Inc. ("ACI," formerly known as Alkaril) should be viewed as 
a proper party to the case, so that it could take the place 
of GAF if the latter were knocked out of this appeal. It will 
be recalled that Alkaril, like GAF, had participated in the 
transaction challenged by the Commissioner's FP AA--the 
transfer of assets to Rhone-Poulenc, purportedly in 
exchange for an interest in the partnership. G-I Holdings' 
officer Peter Ganz has provided an affidavit stating that 
although ACI is a direct subsidiary of G-I Holdings, it did 
not petition for bankruptcy and is not a party to G-I 
Holdings' bankruptcy proceeding. So, GAF says, ACI has 
tax consequences flowing from the adjustments to 
partnership items contained in the FPAA and still has 
standing to litigate the case. After investigating the 
statements made in the Ganz affidavit, and afterfinding no 
information to contradict them or any other evidence calling 
into question ACI's status as a proper party to the case, 
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Commissioner has agreed that the appeal should go 
forward. 
 
Apart from that, GAF also argues that it too remains a 
proper party because of the potential applicability of 
Section 6229(f)(1): 
 
       If before the expiration of the period otherwise provided 
       in this section for assessing any tax imposed by 
       subtitle A with respect to the partnership items of a 
       partner for the partnership taxable year, such items 
       become nonpartnership items by reason of 1 or more of 
       the events described in subsection (b) of section 6231, 
       the period for assessing any tax imposed by subtitle A 
       which is attributable to such items (or any item 
       affected by such items) shall not expir e before the date 
       which is 1 year after the date on which the items 
       become nonpartnership items. 
 
As GAF points out, that provision--extending the 
limitations period beyond the time when a partnership item 
becomes a nonpartnership item (as by a partner's 
bankruptcy filing)--kicks in only if the conversion takes 
place before the Section 6229 limitations clock runs out. 
That then poses the same limitations questions that we 
have been asked to resolve in this interlocutory appeal to 
begin with. 
 
But as the next section of this opinion demonstrates, any 
current resolution of those questions would run afoul of the 
constitutional requirement of justiciability. Hence GAF 's 
continued presence or nonpresence in this litigation poses 
a problem of circularity: To answer that question, we would 
first have to decide a preliminary question that Article III 
forecloses from resolution at this time. 
 
Fortunately there is no need to cut that Gor dian knot. 
Treating the parties' most recentfilings as a stipulation 
that ACI may be treated as a petitioner and appellant 
(substituting for GAF in those capacities if need be), we 
hold that ACI has standing to proceed with the appeal. And 
all of the events already described in the Background 
section also apply to ACI, obviating any need to r esolve the 
issue of GAF 's continued involvement. Nonetheless this 
opinion will continue to refer to the appellant as GAF 
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simply for ease of reference, because that was the 
nomenclature used in the Tax Court below and throughout 
the parties' briefs. 
 
Jurisdiction Over This Appeal 
 
We turn then to a look at the merits. Two issues have 
been posed to us on this interlocutory appeal: 
 
        1. whether the general limitations period set forth in 
       Section 6501 applies, or whether instead Section 
       6229(a) specifies a separate and exclusive limitations 
       period for assessments attributable to partnership 
       items; and 
 
        2. whether Section 6229(d) suspended the running of 
       the limitations period set out in Section 6501(a) when 
       the Commissioner issued the FPAA to Rhone-Poulenc. 
 
But it became apparent to us on reading the parties' briefs, 
and it has been reconfirmed on oral ar gument, that any 
current resolution of those issues would be premature-- 
indeed, neither question may ever have to be answer ed in 
this litigation. That renders those issues nonjusticiable at 
this time. 
 
In that regard, such cases as T ravelers Ins. Co. v. 
Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir . 1995), quoting 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 410 
(3d Cir. 1992), set forth the well-settled principle: 
 
       Of course, Article III, Section II of the Constitution of 
       the United States "limits federal jurisdiction to actual 
       `cases' and `controversies.' " This constitutional 
       provision "stands as a direct pr ohibition on the 
       issuance of advisory opinions." 
 
Travelers, id. at 1154 (again quoting Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 
411) goes on to state the relevant test for determining 
whether an action satisfies Article III's case or controversy 
requirement in these terms: 
 
We have previously noted that: 
 
       [t]o satisfy Article III's case or contr oversy requirement, 
       an action must present (1) a legal contr oversy that is 
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       real and not hypothetical, (2) a legal contr oversy that 
       affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to 
       provide the factual predicate for r easoned adjudication, 
       and (3) a legal controversy so as to sharpen the issues 
       for judicial resolution. 
 
That this case involves not a final decision but an 
interlocutory appeal does not itself pose a jurisdictional 
problem: There are sometimes issues whose resolution will 
materially advance the ultimate disposition of litigation and 
that, for appropriate jurisprudential r easons, need not 
await the entry of a final judgment (see, e.g., Abdullah v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3rd Cir. 1999)). 
But in this instance the issues presented on appeal are 
purely contingent: They will be reached only if the Tax 
Court finds (1) that GAF has an interest in the partnership 
and (2) that the return did not disclose the omitted income. 
Neither of those determinations has yet been made, as the 
Tax Court itself has explicitly acknowledged. 
 
Because the necessity for any decision of the issues 
sought to be tendered to us rests on those yet unresolved 
contingencies, the issues posed fail to present a justiciable 
"case or controversy." More than a half century ago the 
Supreme Court reconfirmed that teaching in Alabama State 
Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945) 
(internal citations omitted): 
 
       This Court is without power to give advisory opinions. 
       It has long been its considered practice not to decide 
       abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions. 
 
And that already firmly established concept has not been 
eroded by time. 
 
At this juncture the Tax Court has not chosen to decide 
whether the transaction at issue was one under which GAF 
acquired an interest in the putative partnership and thus 
whether the Code's partnership provisions even apply to 
GAF. Its opinion was forthright on that scor e, stating in its 
n.5: 
 
       For convenience, we use the terms "partnership" and 
       "partner" without deciding whether a partnership 
       existed or petitioner was a partner in that partnership, 
       conclusions that respondent disputes. 
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If the Tax Court were ultimately to hold that the 
transaction was indeed a sale as the Commissioner 
contends, GAF never became a partner--hence the 
assessment of tax on the proceeds of the sale would not be 
one related to a partnership item, rendering Section 6229 
(and the Code's other partnership provisions) inapplicable. 
In that instance the knotty questions submitted to us on 
the current appeal would not have to be decided at all. 
 
In response to our December 18, 2000 inquiry into the 
existence of jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal, both 
parties suggest that because Rhone-Poulenc filed a 
partnership return for 1990, Section 6233(a) causes the 
unified partnership provisions of the Code to apply 
regardless of the Tax Court's ultimate ruling as to whether 
the transaction was indeed a sale or was a contribution in 
exchange for an interest in the partnership. Here is Section 
6233(a): 
 
       If a partnership return is filed by an entity for a 
       taxable year but it is determined that the entity is not 
       a partnership for such year, then, to the extent 
       provided in regulations, the provisions of this 
       subchapter are hereby extended in r espect of such year 
       to such entity and its items and to persons holding an 
       interest in such entity. 
 
To be sure, with Rhone-Poulenc's havingfiled a 
partnership return for 1990, Section 6233(a) operates to 
render the Code's unified partnership pr ovisions applicable 
to it even if the partnership were to be determined a sham. 
But the appellant here is GAF (or now ACI), and the parties' 
contention glosses over (more accurately, ignor es entirely) 
the relevant fact that the partnership pr ovisions apply to 
the taxpayer appellant only if it is a "person[ ] holding an 
interest in such entity." If the transaction was a sale to 
Rhone-Poulenc--the highly disputed issue left open by the 
Tax Court--neither GAF nor ACI has an inter est in Rhone- 
Poulenc (whether or not it is truly a partnership), and the 
extension of the Code's partnership provisions provided for 
in Section 6233 simply does not reach the taxpayer. 
 
There is another contingency that confir ms the 
prematurity of the present appeal: the absence of any Tax 
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Court determination as to whether the disputed items of 
income were adequately disclosed on the GAF Corporation's 
consolidated return. As the Tax Court found in denying 
GAF 's motion for summary judgment, there ar e genuine 
issues of fact not only as to whether the disputed income 
was adequately disclosed on the return but even as to what 
documents make up the return. If the disputed income was 
not in fact omitted, the six-year statute of limitations in 
Section 6501(e) cannot apply in any event. And if Section 
6501(e) does not apply, the time for the Commissioner to 
make an assessment has run regardless of whose reading 
of Sections 6501(a) and 6229(a) may be correct. Again the 
resolution of that contested factual dispute may well 
obviate any need to reach the difficult statutory 
interpretation questions submitted to us. Unless and until 
the Tax Court finds that the income was impr operly 
omitted, there is no ripe "case or contr oversy" here. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, we conclude that the questions presented are 
based on hypothetical scenarios calling for an advisory 
opinion at odds with Article III's case or contr oversy 
requirement. We therefor e DISMISS for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction the appeal of the Tax Court's or der denying 
GAF 's motion for summary judgment, and we REMAND the 
case for further proceedings on the merits. 
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